Welfare Improving Horizontal Mergers in Successive Oligopoly

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2022
Volume: 70
Issue: 1
Pages: 89-118

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study welfare effects of horizontal mergers in a successive oligopoly model with general demand. We find that downstream mergers can increase welfare if they reduce input price. In an environment with asymmetric upstream firms, lower input price reallocates some input production from cost‐inefficient upstream firms to cost‐efficient ones. In the presence of fixed cost and free entry, lower input price rationalizes the upstream sector and decreases average cost of production for each upstream firm. Both reallocation and rationalization can improve welfare. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for welfare‐improving horizontal mergers and explore how demand curvature, market structure and Herfindahl index (in case of asymmetric firms) affect these conditions. The possibility of consumer surplus improvement and upstream mergers is also explored.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:70:y:2022:i:1:p:89-118
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25