Using Loopholes to Reveal the Marginal Cost of Regulation: The Case of Fuel-Economy Standards

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2011
Volume: 101
Issue: 4
Pages: 1375-1409

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Estimating the cost of regulation is difficult. Firms sometimes reveal costs indirectly, however, when they exploit loopholes to avoid regulation. We apply this insight to fuel economy standards for automobiles. These standards feature a loophole that gives automakers a bonus when they equip a vehicle with flexible-fuel capacity. Profitmaximizing automakers will equate the marginal cost of compliance using the loophole, which is observable, with the unobservable costs of strategies that genuinely improve fuel economy. Based on this insight, we estimate that tightening standards by one mile per gallon would have cost automakers just $9-$27 per vehicle in recent years. (JEL L51, L62, Q48)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:4:p:1375-1409
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24