Board Ancestral Diversity and Firm-Performance Volatility

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2019
Volume: 54
Issue: 3
Pages: 1117-1155

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We proxy for board members’ opinions and values using directors’ ancestral origins and show that diversity has costs and benefits, leading to high performance volatility. Consistent with the idea that diverse groups experiment more, firms with ancestrally diverse boards have more numerous and more cited patents. In addition, their strategies conform less to those of the industry peers. However, firms with greater ancestral diversity also have more board meetings and make less predictable decisions. These findings suggest that diversity may lead to inefficiencies in the decision-making process and conflicts in the boardroom.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:54:y:2019:i:03:p:1117-1155_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25