Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2023
Volume: 15
Issue: 3
Pages: 354-86

Authors (2)

Rossella Argenziano (not in RePEc) Itzhak Gilboa (Tel Aviv University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x, y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:3:p:354-86
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25