Rational status quo

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2019
Volume: 181
Issue: C
Pages: 289-308

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Decision makers often stick to a status quo without explicitly reconsidering it. Yet, their observed choices might be compatible with a fully rational model. We ask when such a rationalization is possible. We assume as observable only the choice of sticking to the status quo vs. changing it, as a function of a database of cases. We state conditions on the set of databases that would make the decision maker change the status quo, which are equivalent to the following representation: the decision maker entertains a set of theories, of which one is that her current choice is the best; she is inert as long as that theory beats any alternative theory according to a maximum likelihood criterion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:181:y:2019:i:c:p:289-308
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25