Walrasian Economics in Retrospect

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2000
Volume: 115
Issue: 4
Pages: 1411-1439

Authors (2)

Samuel Bowles (not in RePEc) Herbert Gintis

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Two basic tenets of the Walrasian model, behavior based on self-interested exogenous preferences and complete and costless contracting have recently come under critical scrutiny. First, social norms and psychological dispositions extending beyond the selfish motives of Homo economicus may have an important bearing on outcomes, even in competitive markets. Second, market outcomes depend on strategic interactions in which power in the political sense is exercised. It follows that economics must become more behavioral and more institutional. We can return to these themes of the classical tradition, now equipped with the more powerful mathematical tools developed over the past century.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:115:y:2000:i:4:p:1411-1439.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25