Outsourcing under Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property

B-Tier
Journal: Review of International Economics
Year: 2004
Volume: 12
Issue: 5
Pages: 867-884

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The paper examines possible reasons behind expanded outsourcing by modeling outsourcing decisions when intellectual property rights are imperfectly protected. Firms in the North develop higher quality levels of existing products and then decide whether to shift some stages of production to the South. Production in the South lowers costs but entails risk of imitation by Southern firms. In this setting, a lower risk of imitation or larger labor supplies can cause increased outsourcing, a higher rate of innovation, and a lower Northern relative wage. Damage due to lower incomes can be offset by gains in terms of better quality products.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:reviec:v:12:y:2004:i:5:p:867-884
Journal Field
International
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25