A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2012
Volume: 120
Issue: 6
Pages: 1057 - 1082

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/669160
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25