Norms in an asymmetric Public Good experiment

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2016
Volume: 142
Issue: C
Pages: 35-44

Score contribution per author:

0.251 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a Public Good experiment we find that rich and poor players have different fairness considerations and that contributions are influenced but not determined by what they think is ‘right’ and by ‘what others do’ who are like them.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:142:y:2016:i:c:p:35-44
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25