A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360]

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2019
Volume: 114
Issue: C
Pages: 318-323

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In Renegotiation in Repeated Games (1989), J. Farrell and E. Maskin present, among other results, sufficient conditions for payoffs to be “weakly renegotiation-proof”. We show that a step in the corresponding proof is not correct by giving a counterexample. We then provide a correct proof with slightly more demanding sufficient conditions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:318-323
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25