Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 1999
Volume: 89
Issue: 5
Pages: 1135-1155

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Grossman-Helpman "Protection for Sale" model, concerning the political economy of trade protection, yields clear predictions for the cross-sectional structure of import barriers. Our objective is to check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model are consistent with the data and, if the model finds support, to estimate its key structural parameters. We find that the pattern of protection in the United States in 1983 is broadly consistent with the predictions of the model. A surprising finding is that the weight of welfare in the government's objective function is many times larger than the weight of contributions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:5:p:1135-1155
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25