Imperfect memory and choice under risk

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2014
Volume: 85
Issue: C
Pages: 127-158

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:127-158
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25