Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good.

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1997
Volume: 93
Issue: 3-4
Pages: 221-44

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good: health care. The private use of health care is modeled as a supplement rather than as an exclusive alternative to public health care. A majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist. The equilibrium characterization is an example of Director's law of income redistribution. A ban on private health care activities is shown to be opposed by a majority of voters. Implications for the size and distribution of private health care expenditures are drawn. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:93:y:1997:i:3-4:p:221-44
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25