Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
A sunspot equilibrium (SSE) is based on some extrinsic randomizing device (RD). We analyze the robustness of SSE. (1) We say that an SSE allocation is robust to refinements if it is also an SSE allocation based on any refinement of its RD. (2) We introduce two core concepts for analyzing the robustness of SSE in the face of cooperative-coalition formation. In the first, the blocking allocations are based on the RD that defines the SSE. In the second (stronger) core concept, coalitions select their own RDs. For the convex economy with restricted market participation, SSE allocations are robust under each of the definitions and the cores converge on replication of the economy to the set of SSE allocations. For the economy with an indivisible good, SSE allocations are not always robust. We provide examples of each of the following: (i) an SSE allocation that is not robust to refinement, (ii) an SSE allocation that is in neither core, (iii) an SSE allocation that is in the first core, but not in the second, and (iv) a core that does not converge upon replication to the set of SSE allocations.