Comparative advertising: disclosing horizontal match information

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2009
Volume: 40
Issue: 3
Pages: 558-581

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while profits rise. With enough quality asymmetry, though, the higher‐quality (and hence larger) firm's price falls with more information, so both effects benefit consumers. This occurs when comparative advertising is used against a large firm by a small one. Comparative advertising, as it imparts more information, therefore helps consumers. Although it also improves the profitability of the small firm, overall welfare goes down because of the large loss to the attacked firm.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:3:p:558-581
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24