Choosing Investment Managers

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2024
Volume: 59
Issue: 8
Pages: 3531-3563

Authors (3)

Goyal, Amit (Université de Lausanne) Wahal, Sunil (not in RePEc) Yavuz, M. D. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Investment managers connected to plans sponsors are more likely to be hired than not-connected managers. The magnitude of the selection effect is comparable to that of prior performance. Ex post, connections do not result in higher post-hiring returns. Relationships are thus conducive to asset gathering by investment managers but do not generate commensurate pecuniary benefits for plan sponsors.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:59:y:2024:i:8:p:3531-3563_1
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25