Stealthy shorts: Informed liquidity supply

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 172
Issue: C

Authors (4)

Goyal, Amit (Université de Lausanne) Reed, Adam V. (not in RePEc) Smajlbegovic, Esad (not in RePEc) Soebhag, Amar (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Short sellers are widely known to be informed, which would typically suggest that they demand liquidity. We obtain comprehensive transaction-level data to decompose daily short volume into liquidity-demanding and liquidity-supplying components. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that the most informed short sellers are actually liquidity suppliers, not liquidity demanders. They are particularly informative about future returns on news days and trade on prominent cross-sectional return anomalies. Our analysis suggests that market making and opportunistic risk-bearing are unlikely to explain these findings. Instead, our results align with recent market microstructure theory, pointing to strategic liquidity provision by informed traders.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:172:y:2025:i:c:s0304405x25001631
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25