Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 2
Pages: 405-407

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:405-407
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25