Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2017
Volume: 156
Issue: C
Pages: 176-178

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper describes a hierarchy with peer hiring to explore the reasons behind the management rule “A’s hire A’s and B’s hire C’s”. Workers are promoted based on talent and therefore like to hire less talented co-workers. This is why B’s hire C’s. The same logic should cause A’s to hire B’s, but there is a trade-off in the model: A’s are more likely to be promoted, and a manager profits from more talented subordinates. If this effect is strong enough, then indeed A’s hire A’s.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:176-178
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25