Employment protection and takeovers

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 125
Issue: 2
Pages: 369-388

Authors (3)

Dessaint, Olivier (not in RePEc) Golubov, Andrey (University of Toronto) Volpin, Paolo (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Labor restructuring is a key driver of takeovers and the associated synergy gains worldwide. In a difference-in-differences research design, we show that major increases in employment protection reduce takeover activity by 14–27% and the combined firm gains (synergies) by over half. Consistent with the labor channel behind these effects, deals with greater potential for workforce restructuring show a greater reduction in volume, number, and synergies. Increases in employment protection impede layoffs, resulting in wage costs that match the magnitude of synergy losses. Offer prices are not fully adjusted, with both bidders and targets exhibiting lower returns following the reforms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:125:y:2017:i:2:p:369-388
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25