Insider trading and networked directors

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance
Year: 2019
Volume: 56
Issue: C
Pages: 152-175

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze the relation between insider trading and the networks of executive and non-executive directors in UK listed companies. While most existing studies focus on firm-specific private information, we find that non-firm-specific information – such as information on other companies and information on industry and market trends – plays an important role in insider trading behavior and performance. Well-connected directors trade shares less frequently and for smaller values. However, their transactions are more profitable, especially when they make consecutive opportunistic purchases in the multiple companies on whose boards they sit. Taken together, well-connected directors are likely to outperform their peers with inferior connections.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:corfin:v:56:y:2019:i:c:p:152-175
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25