Information disclosure, CEO overconfidence, and share buyback completion rates

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance
Year: 2013
Volume: 37
Issue: 12
Pages: 5486-5499

Authors (3)

Andriosopoulos, Dimitris (University of Strathclyde) Andriosopoulos, Kostas (not in RePEc) Hoque, Hafiz (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

An open market share buyback is not a firm commitment, and there is limited evidence on whether firms repurchase the intended shares. Unlike US studies, we use data from unique UK regulatory and disclosure environment that allows to accurately measure the share buyback completion rates. We show that information disclosure and CEO overconfidence are significant determinants of the share buyback completion rate. In addition, we find that large and widely held firms that conduct subsequent buyback programs and have a past buyback completion reputation exhibit higher completion rates. Finally, we assess whether other CEO characteristics affect buyback completion rates and find that firms with senior CEOs who hold external directorships and have a longer tenure as CEO are more likely to complete the buyback programs. In sum, our results suggest there is a clear relationship between information disclosure, CEO overconfidence, and buyback completion rates.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:12:p:5486-5499
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24