Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 1997
Volume: 10
Issue: 3
Pages: 541-549

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index, defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:10:y:1997:i:3:p:541-549
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25