The dynamics of bank debt renegotiation in Europe: A survival analysis approach

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Modeling
Year: 2015
Volume: 49
Issue: C
Pages: 19-31

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Debt renegotiation matters for the borrower-lender relationship to ensure the credit agreement is regularly amended to include new information. I investigate the determinants of the dynamics of bank loan renegotiations using a sample of 1 600 amendments to private debt contracts in Europe. Employing a stratified Cox-type hazard model, I find that initial loan terms, banking pool features, amendments’ characteristics, and the legal environment significantly influence the duration time between renegotiations. Contract complexity, informational frictions in the borrower-lender relationship, the uncertainty of the economic environment, and the legal protection of creditors play a major role in shaping the dynamics of bank loan renegotiation in Europe.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecmode:v:49:y:2015:i:c:p:19-31
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25