Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 157
Issue: C
Pages: 172-187

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study considers waiting times for populations to achieve efficient social coordination. Belloc and Bowles [1] conjecture that coalitional behavior will hasten such coordination. This turns out to be true when every member of the population interacts with every other member, but does not extend to more complex networks of interaction. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow, as well as hasten, convergence to efficiency.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:157:y:2015:i:c:p:172-187
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24