Auction guarantees for works of art

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2017
Volume: 133
Issue: C
Pages: 303-312

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of whether auction guarantees change the bidding environment and whether they cause a change in price once the value of an item is taken into account. We analyze both the cases of third-party guarantees and in-house guarantees. We use two datasets: one of Christie’s and Sotheby’s Contemporary and Impressionist Evening Sales from January 2010 to February 2012 and another larger dataset consisting of all items auctioned at Christie's from 2001 to May 2011. While more expensive items are more likely to have guarantees, we find little empirical evidence to suggest an effect on price from the guarantee itself once the value of the item is taken into account.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:133:y:2017:i:c:p:303-312
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25