From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2021
Volume: 111
Issue: 9
Pages: 2964-3003

Authors (4)

Gabriele Gratton (UNSW Sydney) Luigi Guiso (Istituto Einaudi per l'Economi...) Claudio Michelacci (not in RePEc) Massimo Morelli (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:111:y:2021:i:9:p:2964-3003
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25