Public bank guarantees and allocative efficiency

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 116
Issue: C
Pages: 53-69

Authors (3)

Gropp, Reint (Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaf...) Guettler, Andre (not in RePEc) Saadi, Vahid (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks’ portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks’ portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:moneco:v:116:y:2020:i:c:p:53-69
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25