Contracting under uncertainty: A principal–agent model with ambiguity averse parties

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2018
Volume: 109
Issue: C
Pages: 582-597

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce linguistic ambiguity into a principal–agent contracting framework. Contracts are drafted in a common language. Nevertheless, the principal and the agent may ultimately disagree about the terms of the contract that apply ex post. We presume that both parties are ambiguity averse and for tractability reasons that their preferences take a recursive constant absolute risk averse (RCARA) form. We consider various dispute resolution regimes and analyze how the optimal dispute resolution regime depends on the ambiguity attitudes of the parties. We also provide an axiomatization of the class of RCARA preferences.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:582-597
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25