A matter of interpretation: Ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2014
Volume: 85
Issue: C
Pages: 180-187

Authors (3)

Grant, Simon (Australian National University) Kline, J. Jude (not in RePEc) Quiggin, John (University of Queensland)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We consider the optimality of liquidated damages contracts in a setting of contractual ambiguity and potential for disputes. We show that when parties are ambiguity averse enough, they will optimally choose liquidated damages contracts and sacrifice risk sharing opportunities.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:180-187
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25