Differential awareness, ambiguity, and incomplete contracts: A model of contractual disputes

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2012
Volume: 82
Issue: 2
Pages: 494-504

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We focus on aspects of differential awareness that give rise to contractual disputes. Parties to a contract are boundedly rational as the state space available to them is coarser than the complete state space. Hence, they may disagree as to which state of the world has occurred, and therefore as to what actions are required by the contract. Such disagreement leads to disputes. We show that the agents may prefer simpler less ambiguous contracts when facing potential disputes.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:82:y:2012:i:2:p:494-504
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25