Randomization and dynamic consistency

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Theory
Year: 2016
Volume: 62
Issue: 3
Pages: 547-566

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract Raiffa (Q J Econ 75:690–694, 1961) has suggested that ambiguity aversion will cause a strict preference for randomization. We show that dynamic consistency implies that individuals will be indifferent to ex ante randomizations. On the other hand, it is possible for a dynamically consistent ambiguity averse preference relation to exhibit a strict preference for some ex post randomizations. We argue that our analysis throws some light on the recent debate on the status of the smooth model of ambiguity This debate rests on whether the randomizations implicit in the set-up are viewed as being resolved before or after the (ambiguous) uncertainty.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:joecth:v:62:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-015-0913-8
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25