Can Pollution Markets Work in Developing Countries? Experimental Evidence from India*

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 140
Issue: 2
Pages: 1003-1060

Authors (4)

Michael Greenstone (University of Chicago) Rohini Pande (not in RePEc) Nicholas Ryan (not in RePEc) Anant Sudarshan (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Market-based environmental regulations are seldom used in low-income countries, where pollution is highest but state capacity is often low. We collaborated with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) to design and experimentally evaluate the world’s first particulate-matter emissions market, which covered industrial plants in a large Indian city. There are three main findings. First, the market functioned well. Treatment plants, randomly assigned to the emissions market, traded permits to become significant net sellers or buyers. After trading, treatment plants held enough permits to cover their emissions 99% of the time, compared with just 66% compliance with standards under the command-and-control status quo. Second, treatment plants reduced pollution emissions, relative to control plants, by 20%–30%. Third, the market reduced abatement costs by an estimated 11%, holding constant emissions. This cost-savings estimate is based on plant-specific marginal cost curves that we estimate from the universe of bids to buy and sell permits in the market. The combination of pollution reductions and low costs imply that the emissions market has mortality benefits that exceed its costs by at least 25 times.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:140:y:2025:i:2:p:1003-1060.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25