Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises

S-Tier
Journal: Quarterly Journal of Economics
Year: 1994
Volume: 109
Issue: 1
Pages: 183-209

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When the responsibility for output decisions was shifted from the state to the firm, and when firms were allowed to retain more of their profits, managers of Chinese state-owned enterprises strengthened workers' incentives. The managers paid more in bonuses and hired more workers on fixed-term contracts. The new incentives were effective: productivity increased with increases in bonus payments and in contract workers. The increase in autonomy raised workers' incomes (but not managers' incomes) and investment in the enterprise, but tended not to raise remittances to the state.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:qjecon:v:109:y:1994:i:1:p:183-209.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25