Matching technology and the choice of punishment institutions in a prisoner's dilemma game

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2011
Volume: 78
Issue: 3
Pages: 333-348

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract We experimentally investigate the effect of endogenous matching within a segmented population on peoples' willingness to cooperate as well as their attitudes towards cooperative norms. In the experiment participants can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them a (local) punishment institution fosters cooperation. The degree of population viscosity (i.e. the extent to which matching is biased towards within-group interactions) is varied across treatments. We find that both, the share of participants that choose into the group with the punishment institution and the share of participants that cooperate, increase monotonically with the degree of population viscosity. Furthermore - with higher population viscosity - significantly more subjects claim to support a punishment institution in a post-experimental questionnaire.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:3:p:333-348
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25