Tax design in the alcohol market

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2019
Volume: 172
Issue: C
Pages: 20-35

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Alcohol consumption generates negative externalities that are non-linear in the total amount of alcohol consumed. If tastes for products are heterogeneous and correlated with marginal externalities, then varying tax rates on different products can lead to welfare gains. We study this problem in an optimal tax framework and empirically for the UK market. We find that heavy drinkers have systematically different patterns of alcohol demands and welfare gains from optimally varying rates are higher the more concentrated externalities are among heavy drinkers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:172:y:2019:i:c:p:20-35
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25