Evaluating the regulator: Winners and losers in the regulation of Spanish electricity distribution

A-Tier
Journal: Energy Economics
Year: 2011
Volume: 33
Issue: 5
Pages: 807-815

Authors (2)

Blázquez-Gómez, Leticia (not in RePEc) Grifell-Tatjé, Emili (Universitat Autònoma de Barcel...)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The principal aim of this study is to evaluate the regulation of electricity distribution in Spain. To this end, we begin by analyzing whether the changes introduced by the regulator led distribution companies to improve their efficiency; we then address whether the reimbursements paid to the distribution companies are linked to efficiency; lastly, we examine whether consumers benefited from the efficiency improvements. We focus on Spain because the electricity regulator in that country is a longstanding pioneer in the implementation of incentive-based regulatory models. Our analysis was implemented using the regulatory model proposed by Bogetoft (1997) as a benchmark. The results show that the Spanish electricity regulator did not establish a link between efficiency and the reimbursements paid to electricity companies; in addition, the electricity companies benefited to the detriment of consumers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eneeco:v:33:y:2011:i:5:p:807-815
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25