Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 39
Issue: 5
Pages: 554-561

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. We formally define the concept of satisficing and propose a theory that allows satisficing players to make "optimal" decisions without being equipped with any prior. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:soceco:v:39:y:2010:i:5:p:554-561
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25