Pirates and traders: Some economics of pirate-infested seas

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 111
Issue: 2
Pages: 147-150

Authors (2)

Guha, Brishti (Jawaharlal Nehru University) Guha, Ashok S. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:2:p:147-150
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25