Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 115
Issue: 3
Pages: 455-459

Authors (2)

Guha, Brishti (Jawaharlal Nehru University) Guha, Ashok S. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:455-459
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25