Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 164
Issue: C
Pages: 70-90

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper draws on a natural experiment generated by the National Specially Monitored Firms (NSMF) program in China to evaluate the effectiveness of central supervision at improving local environmental enforcement. We explore a unique firm-level Chinese Environmental Statistics dataset and utilize a regression discontinuity design to assess the impact of central supervision through the NSMF program on an industrial firm's chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions. The results suggest that central supervision significantly reduces industrial COD emissions by at least 26.8%. These results highlight the substantial room for improvement in Chinese environmental regulations via central supervision. A more flexible environmental decentralization regime and comprehensive central supervision are thus recommended for future reforms.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:164:y:2018:i:c:p:70-90
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25