Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2023
Volume: 15
Issue: 4
Pages: 218-51

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by underreporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16 percent after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:218-51
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25