The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulations: Battleground States, State Regulators, and the Environmental Protection Agency

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 67
Issue: 1
Pages: 225 - 263

Authors (2)

Huseyin Gulen (Purdue University) Brett W. Myers (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Electoral College creates incentives for politicians and regulators to direct policy favors toward battleground or swing states. We examine whether this affects regulatory enforcement and find that facilities in battleground states are less likely to be found in violation of the Clean Water Act, partially because the permit limits for facilities in these states are less restrictive. Identification is obtained by analyzing violation rates of similar facilities located along the border between battleground and nonbattleground states.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/728369
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25