Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2017
Volume: 107
Issue: 5
Pages: 154-57

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Asymmetric information is a key feature of the marriage market. In HIV-endemic settings, HIV risk is an important partner attribute that may influence marriage timing and partner selection. We use a sample of married women in rural Malawi to validate a model of positive assortative matching under asymmetric information. Several correlations support this framework, suggesting that HIV risk contributes to adverse selection in the marriage market in this setting.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:154-57
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24