The determinants of bargaining power in an empirical model of transfers between adult children, parents, and in-laws for South Korea

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Development Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 109
Issue: C
Pages: 73-86

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We derive a bargaining model of transfers between adult children and their parents, and then estimate the model using data from South Korea. Our analysis extends the literature on family bargaining by i) arguing that transfers from the couple represent semiprivate consumption (e.g. it is plausible that the wife cares more about her parents than about the husband's parents, and vice-versa) and ii) using results from laboratory experiments to help identify the model.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:deveco:v:109:y:2014:i:c:p:73-86
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25