Incentive-feasible deflation

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics
Year: 2013
Volume: 60
Issue: 4
Pages: 383-390

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

For competitive economies in which the real rate of return on money is too low, the standard prescription is to engineer a deflation—that is, to operate monetary policy according to the Friedman rule. Implicit in this recommendation is the availability of a lump-sum tax instrument. In this paper, I view lump-sum tax obligations as a form of debt subject to default. While individuals may want to honor such obligations ex ante, a lack of commitment (the sine qua non of modern monetary theory) may prevent them from the following through on their promises ex post. When this is the case, there may exist an incentive-induced limit to deflationary policy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:moneco:v:60:y:2013:i:4:p:383-390
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24