A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2002
Volume: 110
Issue: 2
Pages: 382-393

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Why do democratic societies often impose legal restrictions that render various assets or entitlements inalienable to the individual? The explanation proposed here is that these constraints arise as an institutional response against financial markets that, in a sense, work "too well." That is, I demonstrate how a well-functioning financial market can potentially work against a social policy designed to ensure a basic minimum standard of living for all types of individuals. Inalienable property rights and debt constraints emerge as a natural institutional response to the improvident tendencies of some members of society when a majority of individuals share a common distaste for neighborhood squalor.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:110:y:2002:i:2:p:382-393
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24