Corporate Incentives and Nuclear Safety

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Year: 2014
Volume: 6
Issue: 3
Pages: 178-206

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Following electricity market restructuring, approximately half of all commercial US nuclear power reactors were sold by price-regulated public utilities to independent power producers. At the time of the sales, some policymakers raised concerns that these corporations would ignore safety. Others claimed that the sales would bring improved reactor management, with positive effects on safety. Using data on various safety measures and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I find that safety improved following ownership transfers and the removal of price regulations. Generation increased, and this does not appear to have come at the cost of public safety.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejpol:v:6:y:2014:i:3:p:178-206
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25