Two experiments on trading information goods in a network

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2024
Volume: 145
Issue: C
Pages: 1-18

Authors (4)

Hanaki, Nobuyuki (Osaka University) Kayaba, Yutaka (not in RePEc) Maekawa, Jun (not in RePEc) Matsushima, Hitoshi (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We examine the impact of a cycle path on the trading of a copyable information good in a network experimentally. A cycle path in a network allows a buyer to become a reseller who can compete against existing sellers by replicating the good. A theoretical prediction considers that the price of the information good, even with the first transaction where there is not yet a reseller competing with the original seller, will be lower in networks with a cycle path than otherwise. However, our experiment reveals that the observed price for the first transaction is significantly higher in networks with a cycle path. An additional experiment that enhances competition also does not support the theoretical prediction.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:145:y:2024:i:c:p:1-18
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25