Voluntary redistribution mechanism in asymmetric coordination games

A-Tier
Journal: Experimental Economics
Year: 2022
Volume: 25
Issue: 2
Pages: 444-482

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract An inequality game is an asymmetric 2 × 2 coordination game in which player 1 earns a substantially higher payoff than player 2 except in the inefficient Nash equilibrium (NE). The two players may have either common or conflicting interests over the two NE. This paper studies a redistribution scheme which allows the players to voluntarily transfer their payoffs after the play of an inequality game. We find that the redistribution scheme induces positive transfer from player 1 to player 2 in both common- and conflicting- interest games, and is particularly effective in increasing efficient coordination and reducing coordination failures in conflicting-interest games. We explain these findings by considering reciprocity by player 1 in response to the sacrifice made by player 2 in achieving efficient coordination in conflicting-interest games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:expeco:v:25:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10683-021-09719-6
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24